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Based on the expressions in the previously discussed cases, a list of such
possibilities might include actions for marine trespass, illegal detention and cap-
tures, unlawful deportation, false representations, maintenance and cure, wrong-
ful death under state statutes, and other maritime torts.
In Vaughan v. Atkinson' 2 the Supreme Court awarded counsel fees for the
first time in an action for maintenance and cure. The delinquency of the defendant
in that case forced the Supreme Court to rely on the "equitable" 12 4 powers of
admiralty to shape a new remedy and impress upon the defendant the seriousness
of his failure to meet his obligation. Other courts in recent cases have expressed
the opinion that punitive damages could be allowed to deter a repetition of the
defendants behavior.125 The expressions of support in the cases discussed and the
action of the Supreme Court in Vaughan v. Atkinson would suggest that while they
are not commonly awarded, punitive damages, or a similar form of special remedy,
might be useful in admiralty to provide a stronger and more decisive remedy than
is provided by the award of compensatory damages alone.
While the cases available indicate that punitive damages could be, and possibly
should be, recoverable in admiralty, the fact remains that they are seldom awarded
by the admiralty courts. No express of support, however logical and com-
pelling, can establish a legal proposition unless it is accepted by the courts which
ultimately must apply it. Punitive damages have not yet achieved that acceptance
in our admiralty courts. Yet the possibility of such acceptance can not be dismissed,
for the principle has never been rejected and the expressions of support are
numerous.
Byron Boeckman*
123 369 U.S. 527, 1962 A.M.C. 1131 (1962).
3.24 Id. at 530, 1962 A.M.C. at 1133.
125 United Kingdom Mut. S.S. Assur. Ass'n v. Morewitz, 1953 A.M.C. 2079 (E.D.
Va. 1953).
* Member, Second Year Class.
SHIPOWNER'S INDEMNITY: NON-CONTRACTUAL
RECOVERY OF MAINTENANCE AND CURE EXPENSES
FROM THIRD PARTY TORT-FEASOR
Introduction
Whenever a seaman is disabled, either through illness or injury, he is entitled
to be maintained and cured at the expense of the owner of the vessel on which he
is signed. This absolute right is subject to only two qualifications: (1) that the
disability arose or became apparent while the seaman was in the service of the
vessel, and (2) that it was not a product of the seaman's gross and wilful mis-
conduct.1 Given these two qualifications, the shipowner is strictly liable for main-
I Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 1943 A.M.C. 451 (1943); Gir~oaE &
BIAc, Aium Y 254 (1957) [hereinafter cited as GimoaE & B.Acx]. See generally
1 Noruus, SEAmEN §§ 536-608 (2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as Nomus].
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tenance and cure, a liability that is imposed by the general maritime law and
winch cannot be contracted away 2
This oldest of remedies3 afforded a disabled seaman is at present the subject
of little controversy except in one particular area: in the absence of contract
should a shipowner be granted indemnity from a third party for the maintenance
and cure of a seaman who has been injured through the negligence of a third
party?4 It is submitted that to do justice between the parties, the shipowner
should be allowed to recover over against the third party whose negligence has
directly caused the shipowner's loss. Although decisions of the lower federal
courts are badly split, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed itself to this
question.
The Leading Cases on Shipowner's Indemnity
The roots of the shnpowner's indemnity controversy lie in the 1927 decision of
the Second Circuit in The Federal No. 2.5 In this case, a seaman employed on a
barge was injured when a towing hawser from the barge to the tug swept across
the deck of the barge due to the negligence of the tug's crew. The owner of the
barge libeled the tug in rem for reimbursement for the expenses of maintaining
and curing the injured seaman.6 The court, applying New York law,7 saw the
problem as arising out of the employer-employee relationship with the employer
under a contractual obligation to maintain and care for the employee in the event
of injury to him. In the absence of a statutory or contractual right of subrogation,
the court reasoned, indemnity could not be granted, since the proximate cause of
of the barge-owner's loss was his contract with the seaman, while the negligence
of the tug was remote.8 This deial of recovery by the Second Circuit on the basis
of proximate cause became the leading authority against shipowner's mdemnity.9
In 1946, when the Third Circuit was faced with the indemnity question, it
held in Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp.10 that the shipowner should be allowed to
recover over against the negligent third party." In this case, Jones, a seaman in
2 Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 1933 A.M.C. 9 (1932).
3 1 Nowas § 538.
4 For purposes of this discussion "indemnity" is defined as "restitution or reimburse-
ment." BLAcx, Lxw DIcrIoNAny 910 (4th ed. 1951) citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Georgia
Power Co., 51 Ga. App. 579, 181 S.E. 111 (1935).
5 21 F.2d 313, 1927 A.M.C. 1471 (2d Cir. 1927).
6 Ibtd.
7 This was not expressly stated by the court. However, the case has been both cited
and criticized on the basis of its application of New York law to the indemnity problem.
See Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Burmester, 309 S.W.2d 271, 278, 1962 A.M.C. 1057,
1059 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 475, 481 (1960).
8 21 F.2d at 314, 1927 A.M.C. at 1473.
9 Gio Our & BLrcx 273. Cases following The Federal No. 2: H-10 Water Taxi Co.
v. United States, 252 F Supp. 592, 1966 A.M.C. 2040 (S.D. Cal. 1966); Gomes v.
Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 127 F Supp. 435, 1955 A.M.C. 97 (D. Mass. 1954);
Irwin v. United States, 111 F Supp. 912, 1955 A.M.C. 913 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); Houston
Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Burmester, 309 S.W.2d 271, 1962 A.M.C. 1057 (Tex. Civ. App.
1957).
10 155 F.2d 992, 1946 A.M.C. 859 (3d Cir. 1946).
11 Id. at 1001, 1946 A.M.C. at 871.
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the employ of Waterman, was returnig from shore leave at mght when the lights
on the pier went out. In the darkness Jones fell into an open ditch along a railroad
siding owned and operated by the Reading Railroad. Jones first brought a civil
suit against Reading for negligence in maintaining an open ditch. Jones settled
with Reading for $750.00, executed a general release in its favor, and then brought
a civil suit against Waterman for maintenance and cure. After it was established
that a shore leave injury was within the scope of maintenance and cure, 12 Water-
man sought to implead Reading as a thrd party defendant. After upholding the
impleader,13 the Third Circuit ruled that Waterman's claim against Reading had
no support in maritime law, but was instead supported by the common law of
Pennsylvama.14 The court saw the shipowner-seaman relationship as more closely
analogous to that of father and child than to employer and employee,' 5 an analysis
that ran directly counter to the reasomng in The Federal No. 2.16 Although unable
to find any case law directly on the subject,17 the court held that in view of this
higher level of relationship, Waterman could recover the sums it would be com-
pelled to expend for the maintenance and cure of Jones. In support of its holding,
the court relied' s to a considerable degree upon the holding of a federal district
court in United States v. Standard Oil Co.19 that the government could recover the
expenses it incurred for the medical care of a soldier injured by a third party. As a
result, the Third Circuit found for Jones against Waterman and granted a re-
covery over for Waterman against Reading.2 0
In view of both subsequent and previous cases, the decision of the Second
Circuit in The Federal No. 2 is questionable. It was well established in the New
York courts prior to 1927 that in the basic fact situation found m The Federal No. 2
(an injury by one person to another with resultant liability visited upon a third)
an action for indemnity would lie.?' Subsequent cases applying New York law have
12 Pnor to the decision in the instant case, a question of maintenance and cure as
applicable to shore leave injuries was certified to the Supreme Court. In Waterman S.S.
Corp. v. Jones and Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., its companion case, both at 318 U.S.
724, 1943 A.M.C. 451 (1943), the Supreme Court extended the coverage of maintenance
and cure to protect the seaman whenever he is "subject to the call of duty as a seaman,
and earning wages as such" so as to put injuries sustained on authorized shore leave
within the protection of the seaman's right to maintenance and cure. See GimoRE &
BLAcK 258-61.
13 155 F.2d at 997, 1946 A.M.C. at 865.
14 Id. at 997, 1946 A.M.C. at 865.
1' Id. at 1000-01, 1946 A.M.C. at 870-71.
16 21 F.2d at 314, 1927 A.M.C. at 1473.
17 155 F.2d at 997, 1946 A.M.C. at 865.
18 Id. at 1001, 1946 A.M.C. at 871.
19 60 F Supp. 807 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
20 155 F.2d at 1001, 1946 A.M.C. at 871. Cases following Jones v. Waterman S.S.
Corp.. Myles v. Qun Menhaden Fisheries, Inc., 302 F.2d 146, 1962 A.M.C. 1626 (5th
Cir. 1962); Valentine v. Wiggins, 242 F Supp. 870 (E.D.N.C. 1965); Pure Oil Co. v.
Geotechmical Corp., 129 F Supp. 194, 1955 A.M.C. 566 (E.D. La. 1955); Pabellon v.
Grace Line, 12 F.R.D. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Sillanpa v. Cornell Steamboat, 1954
A.M.C. 1189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
21 Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co., 175 N.Y. 214, 67 N.E. 439 (1903); Oceamc
Steam Nav. Co. v. Compama Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987
(1892); Annot., 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1147 (1912).
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reaffirmed this general right of indemnity, 22 with the necessary result that The
Federal No. 2 appears to deviate significantly.
This fact alone, however, would not have rendered the case unpersuasive had
the Second Circuit not based its opinion on proximate cause reasoing,2 3 i.e.,
since the shipowner's liability to the seaman arose out of contract, and the injury
to the seaman was not an intentional interference with this contract, the contract
was the proximate cause of the shipowner's loss and the third party's negligence
was remote.24 In its simplest form, however, proximate cause merely means
legally recognized cause.25 To state that the negligence of the third party was not
a legally recognized cause of the shipowner's loss is to completely ignore a basic
principle of the right to indemnity-
It is a well-recognized rule that an implied contract of indemnity arises in
favor of a person who without any fault on his part is exposed to liability and com-
pelled to pay damages on account of another, the former having a right of
action against the latter for mdemnity 26
The shipowner was not acting as a volunteer when he undertook to maintain and
cure the injured seaman; he was fulfilling a legal obligation that was imposed by
the general maritime law.2 7 It was not a simple contractual obligation such as to
be within the Supreme Court's ruling in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. V. Flint.28
The negligence of the tug in The Federal No. 2 was in fact directly responsible
for bringing the legal obligation of the shipowner into play. As a result, the
proximate cause argument of the Second Circuit was no more than an evasion of
the all-important issue of indemnity.
A further weakness of The Federal No. 2 is that the court, although sitting in
admiralty, applied New York law to a maritime problem.2 9 Ignoring for the
moment whether or not the Second Circuit correctly interpreted New York law,
the fact that state law was applied precludes the case from being authoritative as
to the status of shipowner's indemnity within the general maritime law.
Of greater significance than these criticisms is the fact that under present
maritime law, a shipowner will be granted a right of recovery on the very facts
that were before the court in The Federal No. 2. The basis for this recovery is
22 See The Jefferson Myers, 45 F.2d 162, 1930 A.M.C. 1911 (2d Cir. 1930); Seely
v. City of New York, 24 F.2d 412, 1928 A.M.C. 944 (2d Cir. 1928); Sillanpa v. Cornell
Steamboat Co., 1954 A.M.C. 1189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); cf. Banks v. Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Co., 224 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 904 (1955); Bohn
v. American Export Lines, 42 F Supp. 228, 1942 A.M.C. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
23 The Second Circuit's application of "proximate" cause as a means of denying the
shipowner indemnity was sharply attacked by writers who noted the case. See Note, 12
CoRNELL L.Q. 235 (1927); Note, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 326 (1928); Note, 37 YALE L.J.
533 (1928).
24 21 F.2d at 314, 1927 A.M.C. at 1243.
2 r See PNossEm, ToRTs 282 (3d ed. 1964).
2042 C.J.S. Indemnity § 21 (1944).
27 1 NonMUs § 543.
282 75 U.S. 303 (1927). "[Als a general rule, at least, a tort to the person or prop-
erty of one man does not make the tort-feasor liable to another merely because the
injured person was under a contract with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong.
The law does not spread its protection so far." Id. at 309.29 Note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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the contract of service which was in force between the shipowner and third party,
a factor which played no part in the court's analysis of the indemnity problem in
The Federal No. 2. Under the ruling of the Supreme Court in Ryan Stevedoring
Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.3o and subsequent cases3' construing Ryan, a ship-
owner may, on the basis of an "implied warranty of workmanlike service," be in-
demnified for losses for which a third party who is under a contract of service to
the shipowner is responsible. The Ryan doctrine is the leading case on the question
of indemnity in maritime law8 2 and will be examined more closely at a later point
in this discussion. Its immediate importance is that it at least impliedly rejected
both the reasoning and the holding of the court m The Federal No. 2.
When the shipowner's indemnity question arose in the Third Circuit in
Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp., the court, although allowing recovery, did little to
settle the question on any concrete basis. The weaknesses of the Jones case are
basically threefold. First, the lower federal district court holding in United States
v. Standard Oil Co.,33 on which the Third Circuit relied rather heavily, was re-
versed by the Supreme Court,3 4 which held that in the absence of statute, the
government could not recover hospitalization expenses for a soldier injured by a
third party.3 5 Although the relevance of the Standard Oil case is in dispute, the
reversal by the Supreme Court did considerable damage to the conceptual frame-
work of Jones.3 6 Secondly, the court granted recovery to Waterman on the basis
of a contrived tort obligation of Reading, i.e., breach of a duty owed to Waterman
not to negligently injure any of the seamen in Waterman's employ3 7 The weakness
of this theory is that the jurisdiction of the admiralty court in matters of tort
depends upon the location of the tortious activity.38 Thus, whenever a seaman is
injured on land, and sues someone other than his employer for personal injuries as
in Jones, maritime law is not controlling. As a result there would be no way the
shipowner could be umversally assured of recovery in shore leave injuries since
his right of action would depend upon local law.3 9 Lastly, and most importantly,
the Third Circuit held that, 'Waterman's cause of action does not lie within the
purview of the maritime law."40 This, of course, is true if the shipowner's only
enforceable theory of recovery is in tort. But if the shipowner's indemnity can and
should be supported by the general maritime law, the techmcal form of the right
of indemnity should not be allowed to restrict recovery to only those cases in-
volving third party injuries to seamen on navigable water. The Third Circuit's
30 350 U.S. 124, 1956 A.M.C. 9 (1956).
31 See, e.g., Ammesmaki v. Interlake S.S. Co., 342 F.2d 627, 1965 A.M.C. 1528 (7th
Cir. 1965); United States v. Tug Manzanillo, 310 F.2d 220, 1963 A.M.C. 365 (9th Cir.
1962); Hidick v. Onon Shippmg & Trading Co., 157 F Supp. 477, 1958 A.M.C. 1281
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
32 1 EDE.i.D , MA.-rnE INJUay & DEATH 413 (1960).
3 60 F Supp. 807 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
34 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 1947 A.M.C. 1017 (1947).
35 Id. at 314, 1947 A.M.C. at 1027.
36 Gnmoiu & BlAcK 275-76.
37 155 F.2d at 1000, 1946 A.M.C. at 869.
3 8 Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 476 (1922).
39 See Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Burmester, 309 S.W.2d 271, 1962 A.M.C.
1057 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
40 155 F.2d at 997 n.3, 1946 A.M.C. at 865 n.3.
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grant of recovery by operation of Pennsylvania law is undoubtedly valuable as
precedent within the Third Circuit, but beyond that the Jones case does little to
ensure uniform recovery by the shipowner.41
Why Indemnity?
The entire area of shipowner's indemnity is not subject to tins marked diver-
gence of judicial authority. It is well settled, for example, that if in a suit by a
seaman the shipowner and third party are joined as parties defendant, the ship-
owner is secondarily liable for those elements of damages covered by maintenance
and cure.42 Similarly, if the seaman has already obtained and satisfactorily ex-
ecuted a judgment against the third party, there is no question that the shipowner
can set off in a later action by the seaman amounts of maintenance and cure that
have already been compensated for in damages.43 In view of this, to refuse in-
demnity when the shipowner seeks to implead the third party or else pursue him
in an independent action is at best "unduly techmcal,"44 if not wholly inequitable.
By granting indemnity, the third party is not being made to pay anything that
could not be recovered from him directly in a tort action by the seaman.45 To
deny the shipowner recovery under these circumstances is merely to permit the
third party to place the onus of his negligence on the shoulders of an innocent
party.
Indemnity Under Present Maritime Law: The Role of the Ryan Case
Ryan Stevedorng Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.46 Is important to the discus-
sion of slupowner's indemnity in two respects. First, it is a ratification by the
Supreme Court of the principles underlying indemnity for losses occasioned by
third parties in a maritime situation. Secondly, the case is limited in its scope,
and its application must be clearly ascertained.
The Ryan doctrine, or the "implied warranty of workmanlike service," was
formulated by the Supreme Court in an effort to solve equitably a problem of
considerable magnitude. Stevedoring compames were under certain circumstances
shifting the burden of their negligence to the shipowners. Under the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, the longshoreman's exclusive
remedy against his employer for personal injuries is compensation under tis Act.47
However, the longshoreman could still bring an action against a third party for
damages. The shipowner became the object of these suits by longshoremen be-
cause of the extension of the seaworthiness doctrine to longshoremen in Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki.48 The inequity of the situation was that the unsea-
41 See Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Burmester, 309 S.W.2d 271, 1962 A.M.C.
1057 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).42 GimoPR & BLAcK 272 n.74 and cases cited therein.
43 Myles v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries, Inc., 302 F.2d 146, 1062 A.M.C. 1626 (5th
Cir. 1962); Comes v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 127 F Supp. 435, 1955 A.M.C. 97
(D. Mass. 1954).
4 4 GMOE & BLAcK 277.
45 Id. at 276.
46 350 U.S. 124, 1956 A.M.C. 9 (1956).
4744 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964). Gn.moii & BLACK 251.
48 328 U.S. 85, 1946 A.M.C. 698 (1946). See GCmoRE & BLAcK 358-74. See gen-
erally Noius, MArrnmd PERSONAL IiJupxEs §§ 140-96 (2d ed. 1966).
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worthiness of the vessel for wich the longshoreman brought suit had in many
cases been the product of the stevedoring company's negligence. By allowing the
shipowner to recover from the stevedoring company on the basis of an implied
warranty of workmanlike service arising out of the stevedoring contract, the
Supreme Court in Ryan did no more than to replace the burden of the stevedore's
negligence on its own shoulders.
Subsequent cases, 49 the most notable of which is United States v. Tug Man-
zanillo,50 have made the Ryan doctrine applicable to other types of service
contracts, and, moreover, have allowed the shipowner to be indemnified for all
losses occasioned by the third party. Thus, given a contract of service, a shipowner
may on the basis of an implied warranty of workmanlike service recover the
expenses of maintaining and curing a seaman injured by the third party.
The Supreme Court in its formulation of the Ryan doctrine, however, ex-
plicitly limited its indemnity discussion to only those cases involving contracts
between the shipowner and the third party. Said the Court: "Because respondent
in the instant case relies entirely upon petitioner's contractual obligation, we do not
meet the question of a noncontractual right of indemnity "51 Thus when
there is no contract of service between the parties, Ryan by its language is not
controlling.
In view of tis, the federal district court in H-1O Water Taxz Co. v. United
States52 would seem to be in error in implying that Ryan and its progeny preclude
indemnity for maintenance and cure expenses where there is no contract between
the shipowner and third party. Apparently proceeding upon the premise that
indemnity in a non-contract case had to be based on the subrogation of the ship-
owner to the rights of the injured seaman against the third party, the court
relied on the Ryan doctrine as interpreted in United States v. Tug Manzanillo to
hold that there was no room for subrogation in this situation.53 This is a question-
able interpretation of the doctrine, however. Ryan does not hold that there can
never be any possibility of indemnity by subrogation of the shipowner to the
rights of the injured party against third parties, since the longshoreman in Ryan
had no rights against his employer under the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers'
Compensation Act,54 aside from statutory compensation, to which the shipowner
could be subrogated. 55 In permitting recovery by implying a warranty of work-
manlike service running from the stevedore to the shipowner, the Supreme
Court did not decide the subrogation question and, at most, rejected by implica-
tion subrogation as the basis of indemnity where there is a contract between the
sinpowner and the third party The possibility of a recovery by subrogation
against a tird party in the absence of such a contract remains open.
49 Cases cited note 31 supra.
50 310 F.2d 220, 1963 A.M.C. 365 (9th Cir. 1962).
51350 U.S. 124, 133, 1956 A.M.C. 9, 16 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
52 252 F Supp. 592, 1966 A.M.C. 2040 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
53 See id. at 592, 1966 A.M.C. at 2041.
54 44 Stat. 1424-46 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
55Gn.oRE & BxL.cx 251.
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Non-Contractual Indemnity
Although the right to indemnity normally grows out of a contract of indemnity,
this not a prerequisite in certain situations. As was stated by a federal district
court in Florida:
Broadly, the rule is that one who has been held legally liable for the personal
neglect of another is entitled to indemnity from the latter, no matter whether
contractual relations existed between them or not 56
One application of non-contractual indemnity to a maritime problem can be
illustrated by two recent cases which arose in a federal district court in Penn-
sylvama. These cases involved apportioning maintenance and cure expenses be-
tween successive employers of seamen. In both cases, Gore v. Maritime Overseas
Corp.57 and Gooden v. Texaco, Inc.,58 the court found that the disabilities of the
seamen sued upon were attributable to injuries sustained while in the earlier
service of other vessels. Thus although the instant shipowner in each case was
held liable for maintenance and cure, the court allowed that shipowner to recover
over against the prior shipowner who was in fact responsible for the injury 59 As
was stated by the court in the Gooden case,
The fact remains that the sole cause of [the seaman's injury] was the accident
aboard the [Texaco vessel] Although we have concluded that it is for the
benefit of the seaman to allow him to recover immediately all maintenance from
the last vessel on which he served, ultimate responsibility for bearing the financial
loss should be carred by theosip on which the accident actually occurred.60
There was no contract between the successive shipowners to which the Ryan
doctrine could be applied. The recovery in these cases was based on equitable
principles of non-contractual indemnity arising by force of maritime law.6'
In 1965, the Ninth Circuit dealt with another type of indemnity problem. In
this case, Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks,6 2 a shipowner sought indemnity from a
door manufacturer whose negligent packaging had been responsible for the
injury of a longshoreman. The longshoreman had fallen through the top of a
crate of hollow doors and recovered from the shipowner for unseaworthiness.
There being no contract of service on which the Ryan doctrine could operate, the
court granted indemnity to the shipowner on the basis of unjust ennchment.6 3
Since the shipowner had discharged a liability to the longshoreman that was owed
by the door manufacturer, the court held, the manufacturer could not equitably
retain the benefit thus conferred.64
56 Lowe v. Vessel Madrid, 210 F Supp. 826, 833 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
57256 F Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
58255 F Supp. 343, 1966 A.M.C. 1704 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
59 256 F Supp. at 125; 255 F Supp. at 348, 1966 A.M.C. at 1708.
60 255 F Supp. at 348, 1966 A.M.G. at 1708.
61 "[ Tis Court, while sitting in admiralty, is very largely a Court of equity at-
tempting to render natural justice between the parties involved." Ibid.
62 1966 A.M.C. 1081 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 324, 1966
A.M.C. 2704 (9th Cir. 1966).
63 1966 A.M.C. at 1089-90.
64 Ibid.
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The few cases that have recogmzed a noncontractual right of indemnity in the
shipowner-third party maintenance and cure situation take the position that the
general maritime law supports tis right, notwithstanding reliance in the Jones case
on Pennsylvania law. However, none of these cases except Jones has ever been
forced to deal squarely with the problem of slupowner's indemnity, but rather
have encountered it obliquely.65 As a result, they form part of the fabric of the
maritime law of non-contractual indemnity, but unfortunately do not offer
sufficiently strong precedent on which a shipowner could rely for recovery in
future cases.
The Applicability of Railroad Indemnity Cases
to Shipowner's Indemnity
Under the Jones Act enacted in 1920, Congress granted to seamen the rights
of railway workers in cases of personal injury.66 In effect, the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA) 67 and the cases ansing thereunder were incorporated into
the general maritime law insofar as they relate to personal injuries to seamen.68
Congress considered the two types of employment, railroad and maritime, to be
sufficiently related to warrant this. The Supreme Court has interpreted this grant
to seaman of the rights of railway workers as being merely an enlargement of an
existing remedy (manamtenance and cure for injunes received by seaman in the
course of their employment) "traditionally cognizable in admiralty "69
Under the Jones Act, a seaman, or his personal representative in case of death,
may avail himself of the rights of a railway worker whenever the seaman "suffer[s]
personal injury in the course of Ins employment "70 The Supreme Court has
construed "in the course of employment" to be the equivalent of "in the service of
the slnp," the standard used for deternmning the shipowner's liability for mamte-
nance and cure. 71 Thus, whenever a seaman is disabled in the service of the ship,
Ins situation closely approximates that of an injured railway worker under the
FELA.
Indemnity for third party injuries to railway employees has met with con-
65 For example in Myles v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries, Inc., 302 F.2d 146, 151,
1962 A.M.C. 1626, 1631 (5th Cir. 1962), the court, in denying a seaman's clam for
maintenance and cure, stated by way of dictum that bad the seaman recovered from the
sbipowner, the shipowner could have been indemnified by the responsible third party.
Similarly m Valentine v. Wiggins, 242 F Supp. 870, 872 (E.D.N.C. 1965), the court,
in denying the slnpowner's motion to dismiss the plaintiff-seaman's suit for maintenance
and cure stated that "it is well settled that the shipowner has a right to indemnity from
a third party tort-feasor for 'maintenance and cure' expenses."
66 Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act (Jones Act), 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1964), reads m part: " in such action [by the seaman against his
employer] all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right
or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply
6735 Stat. 65-6 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
08 See Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 1924 A.M.C. 551 (1924); Dixon v.
Serodino, 331 F.2d 668, 1964 A.M.C. 1983 (6th Cir. 1964).
69 O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 43, 1943 A.M.C. 149,
154 (1942).
7041 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
7 1 Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Trans. Co., 361 U.S. 129, 1960 A.M.C. 2 (1959).
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siderable success. Beginning m 1948, a series of indemnity actions were instituted
against the United States by railroad companies. The companies had paid off
claims by employees arising under the FELA for injuries which were solely
attributable to the negligence of employees of the United States. In one case, a
railway employee had been hit by a mailbag thrown by a postal employee.7 2 In
two others, government workers had placed objects too close to the tracks with
the result that railroad employees riding on the side of trains were injured.73 And
in a fourth, railway workers were injured by chlorine gas leaking from gas bombs
that had been shipped by the government without warning and in a faulty condi-
tion.74 All of these conditions violated the "safe place to work" provision of the
FELA and made the employers liable to the injured employees.75
The FELA had no provision allowing either indemnity or rights of subrogation
in actions against third party tort-feasors.76 When the railroads prosecuted these
claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act,7 7 however, the
courts held that the technical form of these actions was imatenal.78 On the facts
of the cases, the United States had been clearly responsible for the injuries which
gave rise to the claims paid by the railroads, and therefore the courts found an
implied duty on the part of the United States to reimburse the railroads.
One inportant aspect of these cases is that the courts were quite amenable to
the railroads' claims for indemnity, and they granted recovery on extremely broad
grounds. In St. Louts-San Francisco Ry. v. United States,79 the plaintiff-railroad
contended that its right to recovery under the Tort Claims Act arose by operation
of the provisions of the FELA. The Fifth Circuit held that since the plaintiffs
claim could be supported by the law of Mississippi, there was no need to deter-
mine whether the plaintiffs contention was correct.80 In 1948, the Tenth Circuit
held that where the accident took place on a federal reservation, the plaintiff's right
to indemnity arose by operation of "federal common law."si And in 1955, when
the railroad indemnity question was before the Seventh Circuit, it merely cited the
foregoing cases as authority for allowing recovery.82 In response to the argument
by the United States that the railroad's claim was quasi-contractual and thus not
within the ambit of the Tort Claims Act, the court said,
7 2 Cbicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 220 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1955).
73Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. United States, 182 F.2d 149 (8th Cir. 1950); United
States v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry., 171 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1948).
74 St Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. United States, 187 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1951).7 5 See, e.g., Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. United States, 182 F.2d 149, 150 (8th Cir.
1950). The Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51, reads
in part: "Every common carrier by railroad shall be liable in damages to any person
suffering injury while he is employed by such carner in such commerce for such
injury or death resulting by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its [the
carner's] negligence, m its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works,
boats, wharves, or other equipment."
76See 35 Stat. 65-6 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
7728 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (1964).
78 Chicago R.I. & Pac. By. v. United States, 220 F.2d 939, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1955).
See Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 475 (1958).
79 187 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1951).
8o Id. at 926.
81 United States v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry., 171 F.2d 377, 379 (10th Cir. 1948).
82 Chicago 11.. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 220 F.2d 939, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1955).
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In all these cases it was held or recognized that the plaintiff railroad was en-
titled to maintain suit against the government to recovery money which it had
paid an employee for damages sustained as a result of negligence by the govern-
ment. These cases also are generally to the effect that it is immatenal how the
action be labeled.
83
In 1960, the Seventh Circuit extended the range of the railroad's right of in-
demnity so that a private party as well as the federal government could be held
liable as a third party tort-feasor. In this case, Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Commercial
Transp. Co., s 4 a private trucking company had negligently collided with plain-
tiff's tram, injuring some of plaintiffs employees. On the basis of its prior decision
in Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, as well as its predecessors, the court
held that the railroad could be reimbursed for its settlement of the FELA claims
brought by the injured employees. 85 The main issue, said the court, is
whether plaintiff, as a matter of law had a right to recover for amounts expended
in payment of hospital and medical bills of its injured employees In a similar
situation this court rejected the contention that a railroad was a mere volunteer
and held it entitled to indemnification for amounts paid for medical services to
its employees for injuries caused by the negligent third party.8 6
To illustrate the similarity between the shipowner indemnity problem and the
railroad indemnity cases, the fact situations that were before the courts in H-10
Water Taxi Co. v. United States87 and Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. United States88
may be used. In Water Taxi, the libelant-slpowner had been hired by a ship
repair company to haul garbage from a naval vessel which was being repaired. A
seaman aboard libelant's garbage scow had been injured when the sailors aboard
the naval vessel dropped a 50 gallon drum of garbage on him. The seaman re-
ceived $3000 in maintenance and cure expenses, but the shipowner's claim for
indemnity from the United States was demed. In the Chicago case, an employee of
the railroad had been struck by a mailbag negligently thrown by a government
postal employee. The railroad settled its employee's claim. for personal m]unes
under the FELA and then sued the United States for indemnity. The court without
hesitation granted recovery to the plaintiff-railroad. In both these cases the injuries
to the respective employees were due solely to the negligence of third parties, with
the employers bearing the financial burden of this negligence. Yet the shipowner
was unable to recoup his loss from the responsible party.
In view of the fact that Congress has extended to seamen the rights of rail-
road workers in regard to personal injuries in the course of employment, the
shipowner indemnity problem, which is an unavoidable consequence of such
personal injuries, should logically be solved in the same way as in the railroad
cases. No harm would be worked on the rights of the seamen and in a very real
sense the seamen would derive a benefit if the shipowner were granted a right of
recovery. Under existing case law, the only means by which the shipowner can
be assured of a recovery against a third party is if he can force the seaman either
s3 Ibid.
84273 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1960).
85 Id. at 448.
86 Ibid.
87252 F Supp. 592, 1966 A.M.C. 2040 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
88 220 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1955).
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to join the shipowner and third party as parties defendant or to sue the third
party first and subsequently the sbipowner.8 9 In both of these situations, however,
the seaman is at a disadvantage in that he is forced to litigate his clan for main-
tenance and cure which would otherwise be uncontested. If, however, the ship-
owner had an independent action for indemnity against the third party, there
would be little impetus to forestall settlement with the seaman in the hope that he
nught bring a suit in a manner which would enable the shipowner to recover over
against the third party Thus, by adopting the FELA solution to the indemnity
problem, the rapid settlement of seamen's claims for maintenance and cure for
injuries caused by third parties would be enhanced, a result that would be in
keeping with the policy of protecting the seamen as a "ward of the admiralty
court."
90
The Need for a Maritime Right of Indemnity
In order to ensure a uniform rule of shipowner's indemnity, the right of action
must be found to arise by operation of maritime law.91 By so doing, the doctrine of
"maritime law supremacy" 92 will prevent a shipowner's action for indemnity from
being subject to the vagaries of state law. Briefly stated, this doctrine of maritime
law supremacy operates when the maritime law is confronted by contrary state law
in non-admiralty courts.9 3 Given such a confrontation, maritime law is recognized
as prevailing.9 4 The Supreme Court in 1953 put it this way-
While states may sometimes supplement federal maritime policies, a state may
not deprive a person of any substantial admiralty rights as defined in controlling
acts of Congress or by interpretative decisions pf this Court.95
The operation of such a doctrine would have prevented a state court in a case
such as Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Burmester96 from denying indemnity on
the grounds that Texas law did not support such a right.
In addition to preventing a denial of recovery by force of local law, a maritime
right of mdemnity is needed to deal with cases that are wholly within the maritime
jurisdiction and which require a determination of rights and duties on the basis of
applicable maritime law. The Water Taxt case has shown that maritime injuries to
seamen by third parties who do not stand in a contractual relationship to the
shipowner are still a problem to be reckoned with.07
By construing shipowner's indemnity as a maritime right, no injustice is being
worked against the rights of non-maritime individuals whose rights are generally
89 See Grm.oi & BLAcK 277.
90 See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 1942 A.M.C. 1645 (1942);
Harden v. Cordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480 (No. 6,047) (C.C. Me. 1823).
9 1 GimvoE & BrAcK 277.
92 Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
93 See GmroEr & BrAcK 374-75.
94 See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 1954 A.M.C. 1 (1953); Chelentis
v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
(1917).
9 5 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-10, 1954 A.M.C. 1, 7 (1953).
96309 S.W.2d 271, 1962 A.M.C. 1057 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
97 Note 52 supra and accompanying text.
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under the aegis of local law. They are not being subjected to double liability,98
i.e., by both the injured seaman and the indemnity seeking shipowner, nor are
they being deprived of any substantive protection of local law. The slupowner's
ability to recover over against the third party would be wholly dependent upon
the third party's liability to the injured seaman.9 9 If a seaman chooses to pursue
the third party tort-feasor independently, he can do so only under local law.100
In the interest of justice, the liability of the third party should be similarly deter-
mined by local law. The only part the maritime law would play in a suit by the
shipowner is that it would prevent local law from denying the existence of the
indemnity action.
Conclusion
The existing split of judicial authority on the question of shipowner's in-
demnity should be resolved. It is submitted that justice and logic require a
resolution in favor of the shipowner. Two of the three writers who have addressed
themselves to this problem have agreed on this.101 The other has merely stated
that at present the weight of judicial authority does not allow recovery.102 Main-
tenance and cure is for all practical purposes a form of workman's compensation
that has sprung from the general maritime law without the aid of statute.
10 3
Statutory compensation acts have granted the employer a right of subrogation
under the circumstances as are present in the shipowner-third party cases.10 4 The
United States has this right when a seaman employed on a public vessel is injured
by a third party.10 5 In view of the fact that the general maritime law is predomi-
nantly decisional it is extremely doubtful that a shipowner would ever be granted
a statutory right of recovery. The burden, therefore, is on the admiralty court.
The maritime case precedent for granting indemnity is admittedly confused.
Cases construing the Ryan doctrine have at least impliedly reversed the holding
of the court in The Federal No. 2 which has been considered the leading argument
against allowing indemnity. Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp. which granted recovery
on the basis of state rather than maritime law has been shown to be inadequate
in its attempt at resolving the problem. The maintenance and cure apportionment
98 In an action by a seaman for maintenance and cure, the defendant-shipowner's
third party complaint was dismissed as the seaman had obtained full satisfaction of a
judgment against the third party. Taylor v. N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 146 N.Y.S.2d 348
(App. Div. 1955) (per curiain).
99 Gmoii & BLAcx 276.
100 The seaman has only two maritime remedies, maintenance and cure and un-
seaworthiness, and these can only be used as a means of recovery against the shipowner.
They are legal obligations of the shipowner. 1 Noams § 543 (maintenance and cure);
2 Noimas § 610 (unseaworthmess). As to the Jones Act, the seaman may only avail him-
self of this federally created remedy in a suit against his employer. 2 Noims § 666.
1011 EDEowzA, MA nrrnv INJURY AND DFA 58 (1960); GII. oRE & BLAcK 276.
02 1 Nonmis § 567.
03 See Gm.moRE & BLAcK 253.
104 E.g., Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1442
(1927), 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1964). See 2 LARSoN, WomnaEN's ComwnrsATioN LAw
§§ 74, 74.11 (1961).
'05 Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 39 Stat. 747 (1916), 5 U.S.C. § 776
(1964).
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